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THE CURIOUS DISAPPEARANCE
OF CHOICE OF LAW AS AN ISSUE IN
CHAPTER 15 CASES
Allan L. Gropper*
INTRODUCTION
Nine years have passed since the adoption in the United States of
chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the U.S. version of the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency.1 Chapter 15 authorizes the representative of a
foreign insolvency estate to seek recognition and various forms of relief in
the United States. Since a chapter 15 case by definition represents a request
by a foreign representative to have proceedings in the foreign state
recognized in the United States, every chapter 15 petition involves an
implicit request that foreign law—or the effects of foreign law—be
enforced in or (in some cases) take priority over application of the law of
the United States. Nevertheless, the statute is silent on the issue of choice
of law, and even though there are a sizable number of opinions that have
construed chapter 15 provisions, they rarely acknowledge that a choice of
law determination is being made, explicitly or implicitly.
Moreover, most of the cases considering chapter 15 are not merely
silent on the issue of choice of law. The provisions of chapter 15 direct the
court to give effect to novel and undefined statutory terms that, it is
submitted, would be better informed if a choice of law analysis were
acknowledged as an important, and sometimes, determinative factor. For
example, chapter 15 provides that creditors and the debtor must be
“sufficiently protected” before relief can be granted,2 and that creditors in
the United States must be sufficiently protected before the foreign
representative can be entrusted with the distribution of all or part of the

* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Southern District of New York (2000-2015) and Adjunct
Professor, Fordham Law School. The author would like to thank his colleague, Judge Martin
Glenn, for helpful comments.
1. Chapter 15 was adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter the Act]. The Act
repealed § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, a much shorter provision that had authorized an ancillary
proceeding to recognize and enforce orders and decrees of foreign insolvency courts. 11 U.S.C. §
304, repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat 23 (2005). Chapter 15 “incorporates” the Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency, which was drafted by UNCITRAL, the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law, to “provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of crossborder insolvency . . . .” U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, prmbl., U.N.
Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014) [hereinafter MODEL LAW]. The preamble to the Model Law is
§ 1501(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter the Code); the articles of the Model
Law generally use the same numbering as the sections of chapter 15 (e.g., Article 2 is § 1502,
Article 3 is § 1503, etc.).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a) (2006).
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debtor’s assets located in the United States.3 As discussed hereafter, choice
of law principles would be useful in giving context to the undefined term,
sufficient protection.
There are also several conditions under § 1507,4 Article 7 of the Model
Law as adopted in the United States, that must be satisfied before a foreign
representative can obtain “additional assistance”5 beyond that available
under § 1521.6 It would be useful if choice of law were recognized as an
important factor in determining whether additional assistance should be
afforded to a foreign representative. As it is, major decisions construing the
statute have used tests, such as “balancing harms”7 or attempting to
determine “how different foreign law is from that of the United States,” that
are arguably inconsistent with the fundamental goals of chapter 15 to foster
cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases and substitute the principle of
modified universalism for territorial principles that had previously
prevailed.8 As discussed hereafter, fair choice of law determinations would
3. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2006). Sufficient protection is the United States version of “adequate
protection,” the term used in Articles 21 and 22 of the Model Law. MODEL LAW, supra note 1,
arts. 21–22. The United States version was renamed so as not to confuse the concept of protection
as used in the Model Law with “adequate protection” of secured creditors under domestic U.S.
bankruptcy law. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), 115, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 178; see also
In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 636 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). Neither “sufficient
protection” as used in chapter 15 nor “adequate protection” as used in the Model Law is defined in
the statute.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1507 (2006).
5. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 70 and 95.
7. See Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd. (In re Qimoda), 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013).
8. Section 1501 of chapter 15, substantially identical to the Preamble of the Model Law,
provides that:
The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border
insolvency with the objectives of—
(1) cooperation between—
(A) courts of the United States, United States trustees, trustees, examiners, debtors, and
debtors in possession; and
(B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign countries involved in crossborder insolvency cases. . . .
11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006). Its goal was to replace territorialism with what has been called the
principle of modified universalism, described as “a pragmatic approach that seeks to move
steadily toward the ideal of universal proceedings while accepting the reality of step-by-step
progress through cooperation.” Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J.
713, 716 (2005); Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819, 824
(2007) (modified universalism “is the approach embodied in the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency (the ‘Model Law’) enacted as Chapter 15 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (‘Chapter 15’) and also by the E.U. Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvencies
(the ‘E.U. Reg.’)”) (footnotes omitted); Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to
Care for Secured Creditors’ Rights in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 513, 524
(2011) (“In 2005, when the United States enacted the Model Law as Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
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foster modified universalism in many cross-border cases and make the
statute’s mandate of cooperation and coordination among courts and estate
representatives a reality rather than a hope.
This Article will first describe the few reported decisions in pre-chapter
15 cross-border insolvency cases in the United States that required a choice
of law determination.9 The Article will next describe choice of law
principles that have been developed in the commentary or literature
regarding the Model Law, there being no express treatment of choice of law
in the statute itself. The Article will then analyze three cases in which a
choice of law issue has been presented but largely ignored and consider
whether these decisions would have been less parochial, and the goals of
chapter 15 promoted, if it had been explicitly acknowledged that a choice of
law was required and considered. Finally, it is argued that choice of law
analysis can promote another of the principal goals of the Model Law and
chapter 15: cooperation among courts and estate representatives of different
nations.10
I. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS IN U.S. CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY CASES
Choice of law was not a major issue in most bankruptcy cases in the
past, in part because bankruptcy jurisdiction was traditionally territorially
based, premised on a country’s in rem control over property within its
borders.11 Traditional bankruptcy theory would thus subject a debtor’s

Code, it continued its commitment to the ideals of modified universalism.”). Even before the
adoption of chapter 15, it was held that by virtue of the adoption of former § 304, “international
comity is a policy that Congress expressly made part of the Bankruptcy Code.” Maxwell
Commc’n Corp. plc v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc), 93 F.3d 1036, 1052
(2d Cir. 1996). Comity has been defined as “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens,
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–
64 (1895).
9. It should be noted that most of these cases were plenary proceedings under the U.S.
bankruptcy laws and were not ancillary proceedings involving the request of a foreign estate
representative for recognition and relief of the type encompassed in chapter 15 and its
predecessor, § 304. Nevertheless, it is submitted that their approach to the choice of law issue is
relevant.
10. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1525–27 (2006); MODEL LAW, supra note 1, arts. 25–27.
11. See, e.g., Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 448 (2004) (“A
bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction permits it to ‘determin[e] all claims that anyone, whether
named in the action or not, has to the property or thing in question. The proceeding is ‘one against
the world.’”) (quoting 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 108.70[1]
(3d ed. 2004)); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 362 (2006) (“Bankruptcy
jurisdiction, at its core, is in rem.”).
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property within the jurisdiction of the court to the local insolvency regime,
ordinarily to the exclusion of application of any other law.12
The more modern cases that have considered choice of law in a
bankruptcy context have generally applied a “center of gravity” analysis,
deferring to the law of the jurisdiction with the most substantial interest in
the matter in dispute. For example, in Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corp., Ltd. v. Simon (In re Simon),13 the court said, “under the Bankruptcy
Code, the bankruptcy court must consider the status and progress of other
nations’ insolvency proceedings in determining how to manage domestic
bankruptcies. In most cases, the court will defer to where the ‘center of
gravity’ of multiple proceedings exists, if one can be ascertained.”14 Choice
of law issues were considered most thoroughly in Maxwell Commc’n Corp.
plc v. Societe Generale plc (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc).15 There,
insolvency proceedings were pending in London and New York regarding
Maxwell Communications Corp., the London-based holding company of an
international publications empire.16 Three banks based in London but
amenable to suit in New York had been repaid the principal of their debt
during the ninety days prior to the U.S. filing.17 There was no dispute that if
U.S. preference law were applied in the U.S. chapter 11 case, the debtor
would very likely be able to recover more than $30 million for the benefit
of the estate—a sizable sum for the day.18 If, on the other hand, English law
were applied, the debtor would likely be unable to satisfy the more stringent
12. Nolte v. Hudson Nav. Co., 31 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1929) (equity receivership); Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Land Estates, 110 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1940) (receivership). A notable exception
was Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1983), where U.S. bondholders of a Canadian
railroad challenged the action of the Canadian parliament in ratifying a modern day restructuring,
substituting new bonds with a lower interest rate for the old bonds without the consent of the
bondholders. The Supreme Court, Justice Harlan dissenting, held that there was no constitutional
protection against the impairment of contracts in Canada, and “that every person who deals with a
foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign government, affecting
the powers and obligations of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known
and established policy of that government authorizes.” Id. at 537. It concluded “that anything done
at the legal home of the corporation, under the authority of such laws, which discharges it from
liability there, discharges it everywhere.” Id. at 538.
13. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991 (9th
Cir. 1998).
14. Id. at 999; see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Transpacific Corp. (In re
Commodore Int’l, Ltd.), 242 B.R. 243, 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, No. 00CIV.1679(SAS),
2000 WL 977681 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2000) (center of gravity in United States); Kriegman v.
Cooper (In re LLS Am., LLC), Adversary No. 11-80093-PCW11, 2012 WL 2564722 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. July 2, 2012) (center of gravity analysis); Florsheim Grp. Inc. v. USAsia Int’l Corp.
(In re Florsheim Grp., Inc.), 336 B.R. 126, 130 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (center of gravity test); In
re Int’l Admin. Servs., Inc., 211 B.R. 88, 95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (foreign state had greater
interest in regulating entities conducting business in its territory).
15. Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc v. Société Générale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc), 93
F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
16. Id. at 1040.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1043.
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requirements of the English preference statute.19 Not surprisingly, the banks
were sued in the United States, and the debtors argued that U.S. law should
apply.20
The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, on first appeal, explicitly
dealt with the choice of law issue.21 Chief Judge Brozman in the
Bankruptcy Court found that English law should be applied on two
grounds. The first was the so-called presumption against extraterritoriality,
a doctrine that U.S. laws do not apply to extraterritorial conduct unless the
statute explicitly provides for such a result (and extraterritorial application
is constitutionally permissible).22 The second ground is more relevant for
present purposes. The court said:
The traditional federal choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the
jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the controversy. . . . The court is
required to evaluate all of the various contacts each jurisdiction has with
the controversy in terms of their relative importance with respect to a
particular issue and make a reasoned determination as to which
jurisdiction’s laws and policies are implicated to the greatest extent.23

The court took note of the “more radical” approach of its appointed
expert, Professor Jay L. Westbrook, who advocated for application of the
“home country” law—i.e., the law of the debtor’s principal place of
business or, to use a chapter 15 term, center of main interests (even though
the term probably had not yet been coined).24 It concluded:
19. Id. (“British law imposes an additional condition—it limits avoidance to those situations
where placing the transferee in a better position was something the debtor intended. See
Insolvency Act 1986 § 239(5).”).
20. Id.
21. Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Barclays Bank plc (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc), 170
B.R. 800, 816–18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Société Générale plc (In
re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc), 186 B.R. 807, 818–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
22. In re Maxwell Commc’n, 170 B.R. at 809. The Supreme Court has developed the doctrine
in cases such as E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), and, more recently,
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). There is conflicting authority as to the
extent to which “Congress intended extraterritorial application of the Bankruptcy Code as it
applies to property of the estate.” Compare Kismet Acquisition, LLC v. Icenhower (In re
Icenhower), 757 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2014), and French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145
(4th Cir. 2006), with Barclay v. Swiss Fin. Corp. Ltd. (In re Midland Euro Exch. Inc.), 347 B.R.
708, 717 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006), and Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.
LLC, 513 B.R. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
23. Maxwell Commc’n, 170 B.R. at 816 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 816–17. The “center of main interests” of a debtor in a chapter 15 case is presumed,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be the location of its registered office, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1516(c) (2006), but the presumption can be overcome. See Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys
(In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2013). The center of main interests is then
determined by a series of tests, such as “the location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of
those who actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the headquarters of a holding
company); the location of the debtor’s primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s
creditors or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; and/or the
jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes.” Id. at 137 (quoting In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351
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In any event, whether one applies the Restatement’s traditional choice-oflaw analysis or Professor Westbrook’s more radical approach, the
conclusion is inescapable that, as Professor Westbrook concluded, English
law ought govern resolution of these suits. MCC was a publicly-owned
holding company, incorporated in England and run, for all intents and
purposes, by MCC executives out of Maxwell House in London subject to
the direction of an English board of directors. MCC negotiated its loans
with these defendants in England and provided that English law would
govern resolution of any disputes arising therefrom. The challenged
transfers occurred in England and the recipients, two of which were
English banks, were located in England. It is certainly questionable
whether the defendants reasonably could have expected U.S. law to
apply.25

The court’s final words were, “[b]ecause I find that English law ought
govern, considerations of comity dictate that these suits be dismissed.”26
The result in the District Court, the court of first appeal, was similar,
although the District Court placed the choice of law portion of its opinion
under the heading, “Comity,” and noted “courts have naturally looked to
international choice of law principles in attempting to apply this canon of
statutory construction.”27 At the Second Circuit, the next and final appellate
level, the Court did not rely on the presumption against extraterritoriality.28
It agreed that there was “a true conflict” between U.S. and English law,
“necessitating the application of comity principles to ascertain the compass
of the [Bankruptcy] Code.”29 It applied “traditional choice of law
principles” through the prism of comity and found that English law should
prevail because, among other things, “England has a much closer
connection to these disputes than does the United States,” and “England has
a stronger interest than the United States in applying its own avoidance law
to these actions.”30 It rejected the position of the examiner in the case, who
argued that all of the provisions of a unitary bankruptcy statute must be
B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). The location most
importantly corresponds to the jurisdiction known to creditors as “the place where the debtor
conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by
third parties.” Id. at 136 (quoting Council Regulation 2000/1346, On Insolvency Proceedings,
pmbl. para. 13, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1, 2 (EC)) (emphasis in original).
25. Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc, 170 B.R. at 817 (footnotes omitted).
26. Id. at 818.
27. Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc v. Société Générale plc (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc),
186 B.R. 807, 818–24 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Judge Scheindlin agreed that application of U.S.
preference law would offend the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 820. She also agreed
that “[t]he bankruptcy court clearly did not abuse its discretion in finding that traditional choice of
law principles ‘point decidedly towards the application of U.K. law.’” Id. at 822 (quoting In re
Maxwell Commc’n, 170 B.R. at 818).
28. Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc v. Société Générale plc (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp. plc),
93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
29. Id. at 1050.
30. Id. at 1051–52.
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applied in a given proceeding, and that, as a result, the lex fori concursus or
law of the forum (the United States) necessarily governed.31 Its conclusion
was that “[a]lthough a different result might be warranted were there no
parallel proceeding in England—and, hence, no alternative mechanism for
voiding preferences—we cannot say the United States has a significant
interest in applying its avoidance law.”32
The “traditional federal choice of law rule” applied by the Bankruptcy
and District Courts in Maxwell and implicitly by the Second Circuit was
also recognized in a proceeding under § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
predecessor to chapter 15.33 In In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.,34 a
foreign representative sought an order transmitting property located in New
York to Switzerland for administration in a Swiss insolvency proceeding
pending there.35 The Second Circuit held that the federal common law rule
and the conflicts principles of New York, where the litigation was pending,
both called for “an interest analysis” to determine which of the conflicting
laws of two jurisdictions should prevail.36 It concluded:
Switzerland’s primary interest is in the administration of [the debtor’s]
insolvency estate. New York’s primary interest is in defining and
protecting the property interests of its citizens and those who do business
there. Thus, New York law is more closely related to the particular
property dispute at issue. We conclude that New York law should apply.37

Although a “center of gravity” or “interest analysis” has been applied in
most plenary bankruptcy proceedings where the issue has arisen, as well as
in an application for relief under § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (such as in
Koreag), note should be taken of a distinct line of authority that has
developed in cases where U.S. creditors of foreign debtors have sought to
litigate issues arising out of a foreign insolvency proceeding in the U.S.
courts, and the defendant moved to dismiss, citing the principle of comity
and arguing that the dispute should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the foreign insolvency court. For example, in JP Morgan Chase Bank v.
Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., the dispute was between a Mexican
31. Id. at 1052.
32. Id.
33. The legislative history of § 1521 states that the “section does not expand or reduce the

scope of relief” previously available under § 304. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 116 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 178. The Bankruptcy Court in In re Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 389
B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), found that chapter 15 imposes a more rigid procedural structure for
recognition of a foreign proceeding than § 304, but, like § 304, affords a court “substantial
discretion and flexibility” in fashioning relief. Id. at 126 (citing Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019 (2007)).
34. Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assoc., Inc. (In re Koreag, Controle et
Revision S.A.), 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992).
35. Id. at 346.
36. Id. at 351.
37. Id.
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debtor and a group of banks in the United States who held a security
interest, under a loan agreement governed by New York law, in receivables
earned by the Mexican company from customers in the United States and
held in a collection account in New York.38 The banks sued in the United
States for a declaration that they owned the funds in the collection account,
and the Mexican debtor moved to dismiss on grounds that principles of
international comity counseled deference to the foreign bankruptcy court.39
The Second Circuit held that the case should be dismissed on comity
grounds, observing that “[w]e have repeatedly held that U.S. courts should
ordinarily decline to adjudicate creditor claims that are the subject of a
foreign bankruptcy proceeding.”40
Strictly speaking, Altos Hornos and similar cases raise the question as
to which court should decide the dispute, not the law that the court should
apply. Nevertheless, there is an assumption that a U.S. court should decide
an issue of U.S. or local law. For example, the Altos Hornos court
distinguished its prior opinion in Koreag by reaffirming “Koreag’s rule that
U.S. courts may resolve bona fide questions of property ownership arising
under local [U.S. or State] law while a foreign bankruptcy proceeding is
ongoing without deferring to the parallel foreign proceeding on grounds of
international comity.”41 The implication is that the U.S. court should decide
an issue of local law. In another § 304 case, Bank of New York v. Treco (In
re Treco),42 the court held even more explicitly that funds could not be
remitted to the Bahamas if a security interest created under U.S. law and
held by a U.S. creditor were impaired, and that the U.S. court should decide
whether the creditor was in fact secured under local law. In any event, the
structure of the Model Law and chapter 15, like § 304, makes it clear that if
the foreign representative wants relief in the United States, the U.S. courts
will make the final determination.43 Therefore, although cases outside of
chapter 15 continue to follow principles similar to those set out in Altos

38. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 420 (2d
Cir. 2005).
39. Id. at 422.
40. Id. at 424. The line of cases referred to, all in the Second Circuit, include Finanz AG
Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter
Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993); and Cunard SS. Co. Ltd. v. Salen Reefer Services AB,
773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985). The Altos Hornos court did not find it necessary to perform much
analysis in order to find the parties’ choice of New York law to govern the security agreement
“unavailing,” brushing aside the security agreement and the debtor’s submission to jurisdiction in
New York because “the fact that such clauses are in an agreement does not preclude a court from
deferring on grounds of international comity where deference is otherwise warranted.” Altos
Hornos, 412 F.3d at 429. The Court appeared unconcerned that the lower courts in Mexico had
repeatedly refused to recognize the security interest of the U.S. banks and that “[o]nly recently
[after six years] did the Mexican federal court rule in J.P. Morgan’s favor.” Id. at 428.
41. Altos Hornos, 412 F.3d at 426.
42. Bank of New York v. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006) (defining the scope and purpose of chapter 15).

160

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 9

Hornos,44 under chapter 15, foreign representatives must satisfy specific
statutory standards that significantly constrain its approach of strong
deference to the foreign court, as well as the foreign law.
II. THE CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES OF THE LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE, THE EU REGULATION AND THE GLOBAL RULES
Recent analysis of cross-border choice of law principles in the legal
literature reveals a split of authority between use of the lex fori concursus as
a governing rule and a more nuanced analysis based on a center of gravity
or interest analysis.
The lex fori concursus is the law of the jurisdiction where the
insolvency proceeding is pending. Its foremost advocate for use in crossborder cases is UNCITRAL, which drafted the Model Law.45 Although the
Model Law contains no specific provisions dealing with choice of law,
UNCITRAL has also adopted a Legislative Guide “to be used as a reference
by national authorities and legislative bodies when preparing new laws and
regulations or reviewing the adequacy of existing laws and regulations.”46
The Legislative Guide’s position on choice of law issues is strictly in favor
of the law of the state where insolvency proceedings are pending. It
acknowledges that a choice of law must be made where there is a crossborder conflict, but it resolves all but two such conflicts in favor of the lex
fori concursus, declaring that “[t]he insolvency law of the State in which
insolvency proceedings are commenced (lex fori concursus) should apply to
all aspects of the commencement, conduct, administration and conclusion”
of an insolvency proceeding.47 The lex fori concursus thus governs not only
procedural matters but also the treatment of contracts, setoff rights,
treatment of secured creditors, and distribution of proceeds.48 Only two
exceptions are acknowledged as subject to another law: “the effects of
insolvency proceedings on the rights and obligations of the participants in a
payment or settlement system or in a regulated financial market”49 and “the
effects of insolvency proceedings on rejection, continuation and
modification of labour contracts.”50 The Legislative Guide does not explain
why these two quite distinct matters should be subject to a law other than
44. See Oui Fin. LLC v. Dellar, No. 12 CIV. 7744(RA), 2013 WL 5568732 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9,
2013); cf. Barclays Bank PLC v. Kemsley, 44 Misc.3d 773 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (extending
comity to U.K. insolvency discharge).
45. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1.
46. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, intro.
para.
1,
U.N.
Sales
No.
E.05.V.10
(2005),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
GUIDE].
47. Id. rec. 31.
48. Id. rec. 31(h)–(j), (q).
49. Id. rec. 32.
50. Id. rec. 33.
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the lex fori concursus, except that the rights of local employees and those
subject to a regulated market are frequently subject to special protections in
insolvency proceedings.51
The position taken by the Legislative Guide, it is submitted, is based on
the proposition that adherence to the lex fori concursus will provide
certainty with respect to the effect of insolvency proceedings on the rights
and claims of parties affected by those proceedings so long as the forum of
the insolvency case is also the debtor’s ‘center of main interests.’ The basic
principle has been forcefully advocated by Professor Westbrook, the expert
appointed in the Maxwell case and author of the ‘radical’ approach (as
described by the Bankruptcy Judge there) that English law should apply
because it was the debtor’s home country law. Westbrook contends:
a clear home-country rule that permits creditors to anticipate that one law
will control most aspects of a default will greatly benefit predictability and
contribute to Transactional Gain. Because we cannot always apply the
home-country rule, we must settle for a strong presumption in its favor as
we consider each choice of law problem.52

The position of the Legislative Guide is not, however, taken by the
European Union Insolvency Regulation—the one statute on cross-border
insolvency law that does specifically deal with choice of law.53 The EU
Regulation, which is in force in all member states of the EU except
Denmark, is designed to coordinate insolvency proceedings throughout the
EU and to require cooperation among courts and estate representatives.54
Unlike the Model Law, the EU Regulation contains express provisions
relating to the “Law Applicable.”55 Like the Legislative Guide to the Model
Law, the EU Regulation starts with the lex fori consursus, providing that
the “law of the State of the opening of proceedings shall determine the
conditions for the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their

51. For special protection afforded in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to employees and participants
in financial markets, see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 546(e) (2006).
52. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law
and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 470 (1991). Westbrook’s analysis is supported by
the structure of the Model Law, which provides for recognition of a “foreign main proceeding” at
the location of the debtor’s “center of main interests” or “COMI.” See MODEL LAW, supra note 1,
art.17(2)(a). See also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Universalism and Choice of Law, 23 PENN ST.
INT’L L. REV. 625, 630 (2005) (“Given the rapid movement of assets around the world today, no
rule can provide a reasonable prediction about the results of a bankruptcy case except a
universalist system applying the bankruptcy law of the center of the debtor’s main interests.”).
Westbrook would in fact locate a debtor’s COMI based in part on the COMI having a
sophisticated bankruptcy law capable of being applied universally.
53. Council Regulation 2000/1346, On Insolvency Proceedings, recital 13, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1
(EC),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000R1346&from=en [hereinafter EU Regulation].
54. Id. recital 2, 3.
55. Id. art. 4.
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closure.”56 Nevertheless, there are several exceptions to the primacy of the
lex fori concursus, including not only the two matters recognized in the
Legislative Guide (labor and financial contracts), but also third parties’
security rights in collateral not located in the state of the opening of the
proceeding;57 setoff “permitted by the law applicable to the insolvent
debtor’s claim”;58 contracts relating to immoveable property;59 and the
effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending at the time of the
opening of proceedings.60 The EU statutory rules are thus far more nuanced
than the principles of the Legislative Guide.
Rules similar to those in the EU Regulation have also been proposed in
a study published by the American Law Institute and the International
Insolvency Institute entitled “Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws Matters in
Insolvency Cases.”61 The Global Rules, like the conflict of law rules in the
EU Regulation, recognize numerous exceptions to the general rule,
application of the lex fori concursus.62 Exceptions include, in addition to
those relating to labor and financial contracts,63 protection of the in rem
rights of secured creditors under the law of a state other than that of the
foreign main proceeding;64 protection of setoff rights;65 and defenses to
avoidance proceedings, unless the law of the state other than the forum “has
no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, and there is no
other reasonable basis for the selection of the law of that state as the law to
govern the transaction in question.66 The Reporters explain that a more
limited
range of exceptions to the dominant role of the lex concursus is unlikely to
prove commercially convenient or acceptable to the majority of parties
engaged in international trade and business, given the present stage of
uneven development of national laws governing such sensitive matters as
security interests, set-off, and transaction avoidance. We therefore
56. Id. art. 4(2). This encompasses not only procedural, but also many substantive matters,
such as the admission of claims, the effects of insolvency proceedings on contracts, and the rules
relating to the “voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to all creditors.”
Id. arts. 4, 2(h), (e), (m).
57. Id. art. 5.
58. Id. arts. 6, 9, 10.
59. Id. art. 8.
60. Id. art. 15.
61. AM. LAW INST., Global Rules on Conflict-of-Laws Matters in Insolvency Cases, in
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY
CASES
ann.
at
200
(2012),
available
at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/557/5932.htm [hereinafter Global Rules].
Professors Bob Wessels and Ian Fletcher are the reporters. The rules have not yet been formally
adopted by the American Law Institute.
62. Global Rules, supra note 61, Statement of the Reporters.
63. Id.
64. Id. r. 15–16.
65. Id. r. 17–18.
66. Id. r. 23.
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proclaim our allegiance to the alternative approach embodied in articles 4–
15 of the EU Regulation (notably in articles 5, 6, and 13) whereby
additional exceptions to the application of the lex concursus are permitted,
under controlled circumstances. . . .67

A further question is whether the position taken by the UNCITRAL
Legislative Guide—strict application of the lex fori concursus—or the more
nuanced position of the European Regulation is more faithful to the Model
Law and to its American counterpart, chapter 15 of the Code. As noted
above, the Model Law and chapter 15 are silent on the issue of choice of
law, and they do not rule out strict application of the lex fori concursus.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that several provisions of the Model Law and
chapter 15 weigh in favor of the nuanced approach. For example, both the
Model Law and chapter 15 require that before substantive relief is granted,
“the court must be satisfied that the interests of creditors and other
interested persons, are adequately protected.”68 Article 21(2) of the Model
Law and its U.S. counterpart, § 1521(b), require that creditors in the
enacting state be adequately (sufficiently) protected if the court, at the
foreign representative’s request, entrusts the distribution of all or part of the
debtor’s assets in the enacting state to the foreign representative.69 Section
1507 of the U.S. version of the Model Law provides that “additional
assistance” beyond that available under §§ 1519 and 1521 can be granted
only if “consistent with the principles of comity” and only if such relief
“will reasonably assure—
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the
debtor’s property;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of the
debtor;
(4) distribution of proceeds of the debtor’s property substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by this title; and
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.70
67. Id. at 3.
68. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, art. 21. The United States changed the term to “sufficiently

protected” and omitted the phrase “the court must be satisfied.” Section 1522(a) reads: “The court
may grant relief under section 1519 or 1521, or may modify or terminate relief under subsection
(c), only if the interests of the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor, are
sufficiently protected.” 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a) (2006).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b); Model Law, supra note 1, art. 21.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b). These are the factors that a court was directed to consider in
determining whether to grant relief under § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, the predecessor to
chapter 15.
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The statute, especially in the form adopted in the United States, thus
contains material limitations on a receiving court’s authority to adopt and
enforce the lex fori concursus.71
Three recent major chapter 15 decisions in the United States have used
the provisions of chapter 15 relating to sufficient protection and additional
assistance to sustain application of U.S. law and to reject the lex fori
concursus.72 Each of the cases relied in part on the concept of “sufficient
protection.” One of them relied more substantially on the holding that the
requested relief was additional assistance available only under limited
circumstances provided in § 1507. It is submitted that each case would have
been better decided if the choice of law issue had been recognized and if a
choice of law analysis had been performed. Such analysis would give better
effect to principles of sufficient protection and additional assistance than the
vague and somewhat parochial tests that the courts used.
III. THREE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A. IN RE QIMONDA AG
Arguably the most important recent chapter 15 case was Jaffé v.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.,73 which involved the liquidation of a
German company, Qimonda, once one of the world’s largest manufacturers
of dynamic random access memory devices.74 Qimonda had licensed its
patents, critical to the semiconductor business, to the giants of the industry,
including Samsung, Intel, IBM, and many others.75 Under German law,
Qimonda’s liquidator, Michael Jaffé, was empowered to reject the licenses
and relicense the patents at a profit, for the benefit of all creditors of the
estate but at the expense of the pre-bankruptcy licensees.76 The ability of a
debtor to reject intellectual property licenses (and thereby, benefit the
estate) had been the rule of law in the United States prior to the addition of
§ 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code in 1988,77 which gives the licensee of a
71. A recent decision makes the point explicitly that these limitations act as “a brake” on
application of comity, or application of the lex fori concursus. In In re Vitro, the court first noted,
among other things, that “[i]n applying the principles of comity, we ‘take[ ] into account the
interests of the United States, the interests of the foreign state or states involved, and the mutual
interests of the family of nations in just and efficiently functioning rules of international law.’” In
re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1053 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Artimm, S.r.L., 335
B.R. 149, 161 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005). The court then went on to discuss “certain requirements
and considerations that act as a brake or limitation on comity, and preclude granting the relief
requested by a foreign representative.” Id. at 1054 (citing §§ 1506, 1507 and 1521 of chapter 15 of
the Code).
72. See infra Section III.
73. Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013).
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Act of Oct. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538.
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patent the option of retaining its rights under the license for the duration of
the contract.78 When Qimonda’s liquidator asked for an order under chapter
15 enforcing his right under German law to reject the U.S.-based licenses,
he presented the U.S. courts with what, it is submitted, is a conflict of law
dispute.
There were several U.S. decisions in the Qimonda litigation. The first
Bankruptcy Court decision allowed Jaffé to reject the licenses.79 On appeal
the District Court reversed and sent the case back, indicating strongly its
view that § 365(n) is fundamental to the ability of licensees to innovate and
compete and that failure to apply it would violate U.S. public policy,80
contrary to § 1506.81 On remand, the Bankruptcy Court agreed, although it
also held that application of German law would deprive creditors of
sufficient protection under § 1522 of chapter 15, which provides that a court
may grant relief “only if the interests of creditors and other interested
entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected.”82 On further
appeal directly to the Fourth Circuit, that court properly ignored the public
policy branch of the decision below; it did not find that § 365(n)
represented a policy that was so fundamental to core U.S. legal principles
that failure to enforce it would be “manifestly contrary to the public policy
78. Section 365(n)(1) provides:
If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor of a right
to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may elect—
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejection by the trustee
amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to treat such contract as
terminated by virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement
made by the licensee with another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such
contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific
performance of such contract) under such contract and under any agreement
supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including any
embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable
nonbankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately before the case commenced,
for—
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the licensee as of right
under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (2006).
79. In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-RGM, 2009 WL 4060083 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19,
2009), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547
(E.D. Va. 2010).
80. In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547, 571 (E.D. Va. 2010).
81. Section 1506, based on Article 6 of the Model Law, provides that “[n]othing in this chapter
prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.” 11 U.S.C. § 1506.
82. In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 180–83 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Jaffé v.
Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 21 (4th Cir. 2013).
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of the United States” within the meaning of § 1506.83 The Fourth Circuit
rested its decision instead on the principle of sufficient protection,
concluding that
the bankruptcy court properly recognized that Jaffé’s request for
discretionary relief under § 1521(a) required it to consider “the interests of
the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor” under
§ 1522(a) and that it properly construed § 1522(a) as requiring the
application of a balancing test. Moreover, relying on the particular facts
of this case and the extensive record developed during the four-day
evidentiary hearing, we also conclude that the bankruptcy court reasonably
exercised its discretion in balancing the interests of the licensees against
the interests of the debtor and finding that application of § 365(n) was
necessary to ensure the licensees under Qimonda’s U.S. patents were
sufficiently protected.84

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion is replete with reference to the patents at
issue being U.S. patents, and it notes that Jaffé requested in his chapter 15
petition that he be entrusted with the “administration of all of Qimonda’s
assets within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, which largely
consisted of the 4,000 U.S. patents.”85 But the identity of the beneficiaries
of the decision is not clear—whether they are holders (whether U.S. or
foreign) of patents whose scope was defined as the territory of the United
States; or U.S. citizens entitled to use the patents anywhere in the world; or
U.S. citizens entitled to use the patents in the United States.86
83. Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Qimonda AG,
433 B.R. 547, 565 (E.D. Va. 2010) (citations omitted)).
84. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 17 (“The principal assets of Qimonda’s estate consisted of some 10,000 patents,
about 4,000 of which were U.S. patents.”) (emphasis added). The term “within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States” is a defined term in chapter 15. 11 U.S.C. § 1502(8) (2006). It
means (i) for tangible property, “property located within the territory of the United States,” and
(ii) for intangible property, such as patents, property “deemed under applicable nonbankruptcy
law to be located within that territory, including any property subject to attachment or garnishment
that may properly be seized or garnished by an action in a Federal or State court in the United
States.” Id.
86. The Fourth Circuit returned to the question of the “territorial jurisdiction of the United
States” in a footnote that rejected the position of the United States, which had filed an amicus
brief that expressly refused to endorse the position of any of the parties in the case. The U.S.
government argued instead that the decisions below had improperly restrained the operation of a
German statute in Germany. The Fourth Circuit stated in response that the bankruptcy court had
properly
conditioned its grant of power to Jaffé to “administer the assets of Qimonda AG within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” with the limitation that he was taking
the company’s U.S. patents subject to the preexisting licenses, which he was obliged to
treat in a manner consistent with § 365(n). As a result, Jaffé is precluded from rejecting
the U.S. patent licenses as a matter of U.S. law.Although this limitation may have
indirect effects in the German proceeding, it does not represent an impermissible
application of U.S. law extraterritorially.
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The Fourth Circuit decision endorsed the action of the Bankruptcy
Court in balancing the harm to the “U.S. creditors” and the harm to the
German estate in determining whether the holders of the “4,000 U.S.
patents” would be “sufficiently protected” under § 1522(a) by virtue of
application of German law.87 As noted above, § 1522(a) requires that
creditors and other interested parties, including the debtor, be sufficiently
protected by any relief granted under § 1521.88 The use of § 1522(a) to
protect one subclass of creditors at the expense of another is questionable.
The language of § 1522(a) does not distinguish between U.S. creditors and
foreign creditors, implying that sufficient protection should be provided to
the worldwide creditors of a debtor.89 Examined from a worldwide
perspective, the “interests of creditors and the debtor” provided for in
§ 1522(a), were all poorly protected by the action of the U.S. court in
showing preference for one subset of creditors (the U.S. creditors) over
other creditors generally.
At least one court in the United States has rejected the notion of
construing the § 1522(a) requirement of sufficient protection by reference to
the nationality or place of business of the creditor. In SNP Boat Service v.
Hotel Le St. James,90 the court noted that § 1521(b) requires that “the
interests of creditors in the United States” be sufficiently protected before
the court may “entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor’s assets
located in the United States to the foreign representative. . . .”91 By contrast,
§ 1522(a), on which the court relied in Qimonda, does not distinguish
among creditors, and the SNP Boat Service judge quoted the statement in
the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law that disavows the proposition
that Article 22 (the source of § 1522) invites a court to distinguish between
local and other creditors.92 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Jaffé, 737 F.3d at 25, n.3 (emphasis in original). This is about as close as the court came to a
conflict of laws analysis.
87. Id. at 26–29.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1522(a) (2006).
89. Id.
90. SNP Boat Serv. v. Hotel Le St. James, 483 B.R. 776, 782–83 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
91. Id. at 782, 784–85 (emphasis added).
92. The Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency states the
following:
In many cases the affected creditors will be “local” creditors. Nevertheless, in enacting
article 22, it is not advisable to attempt to limit it to local creditors. Any express
reference to local creditors in paragraph 1 would require a definition of those creditors.
An attempt to draft such a definition (and to establish criteria according to which a
particular category of creditors might receive special treatment) would not only show
the difficulty of crafting an appropriate text but would also reveal that there is no
justification for discriminating [among] creditors on the basis of criteria such as place
of business or nationality.
Guide to Enactment, in MODEL LAW, supra note 1, para. 198, substantially similar to para. 163 of
the 1997 version of the Guide. U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Guide to Enactment, in
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Qimonda rejected this construction of § 1522(a), relying on a reference to
“local creditors” in paragraph 35 of the 1997 version of the Guide to
Enactment, a very general, introductory description of the purposes of the
Model Law that was omitted when the Guide to Enactment was revised in
2013.93
Even if Qimonda is arguably wrong in its analysis of § 1522(a), it is an
authoritative construction of a U.S. statute by an appellate court and an
important precedent.94 Further, § 1507 of the statute, as adopted in the
United States, also provides a special degree of protection to creditors in the
United States.95 In the Model Law, article 7 looks like a throwaway; it
merely provides, “[n]othing in this Law limits the power of a court or a
[insert the title of the person or body administering a reorganization or
liquidation under the law of the enacting State] to provide additional
assistance to a foreign representative under other laws of this State.”96 In the
United States, the provision of “additional assistance to a foreign
representative under [the Bankruptcy Code] or under other laws of the
United States” is circumscribed or enhanced, as the case may be, by three
provisos: (i) the additional assistance is subject to the specific limitations
stated elsewhere in chapter 15; (ii) the provision of additional assistance
must be “consistent with the principles of comity”; and (iii) the additional
assistance must reasonably satisfy the same conditions to relief contained in
former § 304, which chapter 15 replaced.97
Thus, in the United States, the sufficient protection provisions of
§§ 1521(b) and 1522(a) are not the only parts of chapter 15 that are relevant
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT].
93. Paragraph 35 of the 1997 version of the Guide stated:
The Model Law contains provisions such as the following to protect the interests of the
creditors (in particular local creditors), the debtor and other affected persons: the
availability of temporary relief upon application for recognition of a foreign proceeding
or upon recognition is subject to the discretion of the court; it is expressly stated that in
granting such relief the court must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors and
other interested persons, including the debtor, are adequately protected (article 22,
paragraph 1); the court may subject the relief it grants to conditions it considers
appropriate; and the court may modify or terminate the relief granted, if so requested by
a person affected thereby (article 22, paragraphs 2 and 3).
1997 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 92, para. 35.
94. Moreover, a similar construction of the term sufficient protection was seemingly reached
in a footnote in the decision of the Fifth Circuit in In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1067
n.42 (5th Cir. 2012), discussed further infra Part III.B.
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1507 (2006).
96. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, art. 7.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 304, repealed by Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat 23 (2005). See supra text at note
70 for the conditions to the grant of additional assistance in § 1507. The only change from the
conditions in former § 304 is that comity, which was formerly listed as condition (5), is now in the
preamble as a general requirement, in that all assistance must be “consistent with the principles of
comity.” 11 U.S.C. § 1501.

2014]

Disappearance of Choice of Law in Chapter 15 Cases

169

to the protection of local creditors. Section 1507 potentially provides an
even more potent weapon. The importance of that provision is demonstrated
by the decision of the Fifth Circuit in In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V.98
B. IN RE VITRO
In Vitro, the U.S. courts declined to enforce, under chapter 15, a
Mexican plan that discharged $1.2 billion of bonds guaranteed by the
debtor’s operating subsidiaries through partial payment under the debtor’s
plan.99 The bondholders held instruments governed by New York law, the
issuers had submitted to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, and the
holders obtained judgments in New York against the subsidiaries.100 The
Mexican plan in effect released the subsidiaries from their financial debts
through a plan that did not pay certain creditors of the subsidiaries in full.101
The subsidiaries had never filed in the bankruptcy proceedings,102 and these
third-party releases were questionable, at best, under U.S. law.
The Vitro court relied in a footnote on the same sufficient protection
analysis of § 1522(a) as Qimonda.103 However, its principal rationale for
refusing to recognize the Mexican plan was § 1507(b)(4), which requires
that the “distribution of proceeds of the debtor’s property [must be]
substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by” the Bankruptcy
Code.104 In the Vitro decision, the Court found that the relief sought by the
Mexican debtor amounted to enforcement of third-party releases, that such
relief was not available under the general provisions of §§ 1521 and 1522,
that such relief would be “additional assistance under § 1507,” and that “the

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031.
Id. at 1037–38.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1039.
Id.
Its analysis was brief, the Vitro court noting that even if the relief sought by the Mexican
representative did not constitute additional assistance, subject to § 1507, “enforcement of this Plan
would be precluded under § 1522 for failing to provide an adequate ‘balance between relief that
may be granted to the foreign representative and the interests of the persons that may be affected
by such relief.’” Id. at 1067 n.42 (quoting In re Int’l Banking Corp. B.S.C., 439 B.R. 614, 626
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Nevertheless, use of § 1522(a) in the Vitro case would appear to be
more readily justified than in Qimonda, because in Vitro the U.S. creditors objecting to the
Mexican plan held more than $1.2 billion of bond debt that was initially issued by subsidiaries of
Vitro and that Vitro assumed and paid in part in its plan. The only other “creditors” of any size
were the intercompany claims held by the subsidiaries and controlled by the parent; they outvoted
the bonds in the plan approval process only because Vitro had apparently undertaken what the
Fifth Circuit called steps “orchestrating a balance transfer of several billion dollars between itself
and its subsidiaries, turning those subsidiaries into creditors, prior to entering into the concurso
proceeding and failing promptly to disclose the existence of these newly minted insider creditors.”
Id. at 1053. In other words, the vast majority of general creditors not controlled by the debtor was
not sufficiently protected.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b)(4) (2006).
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bankruptcy court correctly determined that relief was precluded by
§ 1507(b)(4).”105
In order to reach its decision, the Fifth Court had to reconcile the
provisions of § 1507, providing for “additional assistance,” with the general
provisions of § 1521, which authorizes “any appropriate relief.”106 On the
face of the statute, it is not at all clear where relief under § 1521 (and
§ 1522, which modifies it) is appropriate and where it should be considered
additional assistance under § 1507. The Vitro opinion attempts to reconcile
the two by a three-step analysis, considering first whether the relief sought
is specifically enumerated in § 1521(a) or (b), and, if not, considering
whether it is “appropriate relief” available under § 1521.107 The Court in
Vitro said that such “appropriate relief” was “relief previously available
under Chapter 15’s predecessor, § 304” and then concluded that “[o]nly if a
court determines that the requested relief was not formerly available under
§ 304 should a court consider whether relief would be appropriate as
additional assistance under § 1507.”108 This is a debatable conclusion.109 In
any event, the point for purposes of this Article is that the provisions of
105. In re Vitro, 701 F.3d at 1060.
106. Id. at 1057–61. Section 1521 provides without qualification that upon recognition, “the

court may, at the request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief, including
. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1521 (2006) (emphasis added). Section 1521 then goes on to identify seven
specific forms of relief, but its use of the word “including” prior to the list is “not limiting.” See 11
U.S.C. § 102(3) (“‘includes’ and ‘including’ are not limiting”).
107. Vitro, 701 F.3d at 1054.
108. Id.
109. The Court relied on a passage in the legislative history of § 1521, which stated that the
relief available under § 1521 was not intended to reduce or enlarge the relief formerly available
under § 304. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), 116, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 178. There is
accordingly a basis for the Vitro court’s conclusion that § 1521 relief is so limited, and that any
further relief would be additional assistance subject to the conditions of § 1507. However, the
conditions to the grant of “additional relief” in § 1507 are the same as those that conditioned relief
under former § 304. If § 1521 relief is limited to that available under former § 304, and if § 304
had the same conditions to relief as § 1507, the logical result of the Vitro court’s analysis is that
assistance under § 1507 is identical to that also made available under § 1521. Any such conclusion
must be rejected by virtue of the very different wording of the sections as well as the fact that
§ 1507 relief is “additional assistance,” i.e., additional to that otherwise available under the statute.
It is submitted that the legislative history did not get it right. A differently focused analysis would
seemingly rely on the difference between the language of § 1521 (appropriate relief) and that of
§ 1507 (additional assistance). See In re Sino-Forest Corp., 501 B.R. 655, 664 nn.3–4 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 741 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). See also
CT Inv. Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Cozumel Caribe, S.A. de C.V. (In re Cozumel Caribe S.A. de C.V.),
482 B.R. 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012), a case involving funds deposited in the United States by a
Mexican debtor. The Bankruptcy Court held that it would not be manifestly contrary to U.S.
public policy to issue a temporary stay and give the parties an opportunity to litigate issues
regarding the funds in a Mexican court, or to temporarily recognize a Mexican court order that had
enjoined the U.S. creditors from applying the funds in escrow to the debt, noting that U.S.
bankruptcy courts issue such temporary injunctions where appropriate. Id. at 112–13. The court
nevertheless conditioned the stay on the parties promptly proceeding to determine the issues in
Mexico. Id. at 115. Cozumel Caribe is also one of the rare chapter 15 cases that that have noted
the need to consider conflicts issues in determining the issues in dispute. Id. at 115 n.17.
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§ 1507, and § 1507(b)(4) in particular, will in certain cases provide an
alternative basis than the sufficient protection provisions of § 1522(a) for
refusing relief sought by a foreign representative.110
Before drawing any conclusions from these highly visible cases, it is
useful to consider one less well-known decision that also relied on the
principle of sufficient protection to deny relief to a foreign representative.
C. IN RE SIVEC SRL
A third recent decision of the U.S. courts, and one that also rests on the
principle of sufficient protection, is Sivec, litigation growing out of an
American company’s purchase of parts manufactured by an Italian
enterprise for use on a construction project in Qatar.111 The American
company had retained in escrow 10% of the purchase price of the parts to
cover claims made during a two-year warranty period ending in July
2009.112 By that date, the Italian company had filed for a concordato
preventivo113 under Italian law, a plan had been confirmed, and the seller’s
retainage claim against the U.S. company was apparently the only asset of
the Italian estate.114 The Italian judicial receiver duly filed a chapter 15
petition and obtained recognition of the Italian proceeding as a foreign main
proceeding, but he was granted very little other relief.115 The U.S. courts
denied the receiver’s request for a stay of ongoing litigation in Oklahoma of
a breach of contract claim by the U.S. purchaser, and the Italian receiver
ended up counterclaiming for turnover of the retainage in escrow.116 After a
jury found that the Italian receiver was entitled to $952,840 on the warranty
retainage claim, while the American purchaser was entitled to $1,744,043
on its breach of contract claim, the American purchaser moved in the
110. The Fifth Circuit’s decision made it plain that a Mexican plan does not have to conform to
U.S. bankruptcy law in order to obtain additional assistance under § 1507. See In re Vitro S.A.B.
de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012). It quoted an earlier § 304 decision where the Fifth Circuit
said, “the foreign laws need not be identical to their counterparts under the laws of the United
States; they merely must not be repugnant to our laws and policies.” Id. at 1044 (quoting
Schimmelpenninck v. Byrne (In re Schimmelpenninck), 183 F.3d 347, 365 (5th Cir. 1999)). The
Vitro court also stressed that “[g]iven Chapter 15’s heavy emphasis on comity, it is not necessary,
nor to be expected, that the relief requested by a foreign representative be identical to, or available
under, United States law.” Id. at 1053 (citing In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Inv., 421
B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (a case that had enforced third-party releases in a chapter
15 proceeding)). However, the result in Vitro was to reject the Mexican plan on the ground that it
did not follow the order of distribution in a U.S. case closely enough.
111. In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. 310 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2012).
112. Id. at 313.
113. Concordato preventivo is a form of reorganization under Italian law. See Campaniello
Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1997) (under Italian law, the
Concordato Preventivo “contains provisions that permit restructuring of debts in a fashion similar
to Chapter 11 of the United States bankruptcy laws.”).
114. In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. at 313.
115. Id. at 315.
116. Id.
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bankruptcy court for permission to set off its breach of contract claim
against its liability on the balance of the escrow (eliminating any liability),
and the Italian receiver moved for an order remitting the portion of the
escrow to which he was found entitled to Italy.117
The decision of the U.S. bankruptcy court is colored by the failure of
the Italian estate to give reasonable notice of the proceedings to the U.S.
purchaser; by an abortive, badly handled “request for comity” emanating
from Italy; by uncertainty whether the late claim would be admitted in Italy;
and by a lack of clarity as to whether setoff rights would be recognized in
Italy.118 In any event, the bankruptcy court held that “[c]omity is only to be
extended so long as the interests of U.S. creditors are sufficiently protected,
and so long as any actions taken are not manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the United States.”119 The bankruptcy court further held that it was
“unconvinced that the interests of U.S. creditors have been or will be
protected in the Italian proceeding.”120 Finally, the court held that under
U.S. bankruptcy law, the American purchaser “is a secured creditor to the
extent of its right to setoff against the retainage it holds,” and its treatment
“in Italy would be vastly different than in the United States: its security
interest is not merely threatened in the Italian proceeding, it does not
exist.”121 It rejected the request of the Italian receiver for comity or turnover
of the property because it did not believe the purchaser’s “interests will be
sufficiently protected if it is ordered to turnover the funds and file a claim in
Italy, and because the equities and law support recoupment and setoff.”122
IV. THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE
In each of the three cases discussed above, the U.S. court resolved the
issue in favor of providing sufficient protection to a subset of U.S. creditors.
Vitro further decided that the relief sought by the foreign representative was
additional assistance barred by a specific condition in § 1507 that provides
the U.S. courts with broad discretion to deny relief.123 Although the cases
all ignore conflict of laws as an issue, it is submitted that they would have
been better decided by explicit recognition that each required a choice of
law and that a choice of law analysis would have informed the novel
concepts of “sufficient protection” and “additional assistance.”
In Qimonda, the most difficult of the cases, the Fourth Circuit endorsed
a test that it said the bankruptcy court had reasonably applied, balancing the
117. Id. at 316–17. The American company would presumably be permitted to file a (late) claim
for its breach of contract damages, but this was not entirely clear.
118. Id. at 318–22.
119. Id. at 320, 324 (citing §§ 1501(a)(3), 1506, 1507(b), 1521, 1522 of chapter 15).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 328.
123. In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1060 (5th Cir. 2012).
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harm to holders of the 4,000 “U.S. patents” if German rejection law
prevailed against the harm to the German liquidator if § 365(n) of the
Bankruptcy Code applied.124 It found that such a balancing test was the
appropriate way to enforce § 1522(a).125 If it arguably erred in using
§ 1522(a) to weigh the rights of one group of creditors against another, it
could have reached the same result by reliance on § 1507 and treatment of
the relief sought by the German liquidator as “additional assistance.”126
It is suggested that a case like Qimonda would be better decided—and
would more likely be decided in favor of the application of foreign law—if
it were acknowledged that the concept of sufficient protection calls for
application of choice of law principles rather than a balancing of the harm
to “them” against the harm to “us.” Qimonda involved the rights of the
administrator of an insolvent estate as a consequence of the default of one
of the parties to a contract. The Legislative Guide to the Model Law, the EU
Regulation, and the Global Rules deem the contractual rights of an
insolvent estate after default an issue to be governed by the lex fori
concursus or, in the case of Qimonda, German law.127 This principle
recognizes the benefits of uniform treatment of all unsecured creditors
throughout the world. It is not certain that this principle would have carried
the day and outweighed the concern of the court in Qimonda over the effect
of rejection on patent rights and entrepreneurship. Even if the result would
not have been different upon a choice of law analysis, the courts would at
least have construed the novel term, sufficient protection, by reference to
familiar concepts. Hopefully, they would have given more weight to the lex
fori concursus, and the concept of sufficient protection would not have been
based on a balancing test that finds no explicit support in either the statute
or in the previous resolution of choice of law issues in cross-border
insolvency disputes.
It would also have been constructive for the courts in Qimonda to
consider that traditional contract conflict principles in the United States
start with the rule that “[t]he law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue.”128 If the holders of the 4,000 U.S. patents
in Qimonda had signed license agreements that provided that German law
would govern, the parties’ own agreements would point in the direction of
application of foreign law and would constitute evidence that the U.S.
licensees should have recognized the risk they were taking by contracting
124.
125.
126.
127.

Jaffé v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 737 F.3d 14, 29–31 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 31.
11 U.S.C. § 1507 (2006).
See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 1, rec. 31; EU Regulation, supra note 53, art. 4;
Global Rules, supra note 61, r. 15, 17, 22–23.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
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with a German party. They could not reasonably claim to be insufficiently
protected by application of German law. Traditional U.S. conflicts law
would point in the same direction, on the argument that Germany had a
stronger interest in the application of its law, providing for the uniform
treatment of licensees worldwide, than the U.S. had in the application of its
law, especially if the licensees were not all U.S. entities.129
Similar comments may be made with regard to the decision in Sivec.
The court decided the issue on the basis of the sufficient protection of the
U.S. creditor of the Italian estate.130 The U.S. creditor in Sivec did not have
to rely on the general sufficient protection provisions of § 1522(a) but could
more appropriately rely on the specific requirement of § 1521(b) that a
court must be “satisfied that the interests of creditors in the United States
are sufficiently protected” before it can “entrust the distribution of all or
part of the debtor’s assets located in the United States to the foreign
representative. . . .”131 Although the decision of the bankruptcy court did not
take note of the different wording of § 1522 and § 1521(b), there was ample
evidence of lack of protection of the rights of the U.S. creditor in the failure
of the Italian debtor to give adequate notice of the Italian proceedings, and
to make clear how the interests of the U.S. party would be protected in
Italy.132
In any event, the real issue in Sivec was whether U.S. or Italian law
ought to govern the right of the U.S. creditor to set off its claim against the
Italian debtor against the escrow account it was holding, presumably in
Oklahoma. As noted above, the Italian debtor argued that Italian law
recognizes a right of setoff. Thus, it is not entirely clear there was a conflict
of laws. If, however, Italy does not recognize that creditors who owe debts
to a bankruptcy estate have a preferred right to offset claims against the
bankrupt, there would have been a direct conflict. As with almost every
other issue, the Legislative Guide would decide this conflict in favor of
application of the lex fori concursus, or Italian law. The Global Rules (and
traditional U.S. conflicts principles), however, are more nuanced.
Recognizing a conflict among national laws in the recognition of setoff
rights, the Global Rules (like the EU Regulation) provide that “[i]nsolvency
proceedings shall not affect the right of creditors to demand the set-off of
their claims against the claims of the debtor, where such a set-off is
permitted by the law applicable to the insolvent debtor’s claim.”133 Under
129. It is recognized, as stated in § 187 of the Restatement of Conflicts, that there are issues,
such as the effect of the insolvency of one of the parties, and that the parties to a contract cannot
resolve through a choice of law clause in their contract. Id. It is suggested, nevertheless, that the
choice of German law to govern the contract would point toward application of German
insolvency law in this situation.
130. In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. 310, 324 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2012).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
132. See In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. 310.
133. See Global Rules, supra note 61, r. 17.
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the Global Rules, it would appear that the Italian debtor’s claim was
governed by Oklahoma law, which is presumed to be the law applicable to
the escrowed funds and was certainly the law of the situs of the funds.134 On
this analysis, the case was properly decided in favor of the creditor.
Moreover, under U.S. law, the right of setoff that the U.S. creditor
possessed is viewed as similar to a right of a secured party in collateral.135
Under the Global Rules, the in rem rights of a secured creditor under the
law of a state other than that of the foreign main proceeding are also
respected.136 On this basis, Sivec would not have been justified in stripping
the U.S. creditor of its U.S. property rights, and the U.S. creditor would
have been entitled to sufficient protection against this result.
In Vitro, the principal question was whether it was appropriate to apply
Mexican law to discharge the debt of creditors of an affiliate of the debtor
by providing them with a partial distribution from the bankruptcy estate.137
Under U.S. law such “third-party releases” are valid only under narrow
circumstances, and they are invariably rejected in the Fifth Circuit, where
the Vitro chapter 15 case was pending.138 Under Mexican law, applicable at
the time of the Vitro plan, third-party releases were presumably valid, and a
Mexican court had confirmed the Vitro plan.139 The choice of law issue was
whether to apply the majority U.S. rule or Mexican insolvency principles.
Neither the recommendations of the Legislative Guide nor the Global Rules
deal explicitly with the rights of creditors of an affiliate of the debtor.
As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit decided the case by reference to
the conditions to “additional assistance” in § 1507 and, secondarily, by
reliance on sufficient protection in § 1522(a).140 It is suggested that the
analysis would have been clarified by application of U.S. conflict of law
principles. The protections that the U.S. creditors received from the
134. Although all of the applicable facts in Sivec are unknown, due to the absence of a choice of
law analysis, it is assumed that the Italian debtor’s claim against the U.S. counterparty was
governed by the laws of Oklahoma, where the escrow was located. The law governing the
underlying contract claim against the Italian debtor is also unknown, but it is assumed that the
effects of that claim in the Italian proceeding were governed by Italian law.
135. Another way to analyze the issues would be to view the U.S. party as having a security
interest in the escrow account by virtue of its setoff rights. The U.S. court, in fact, found that
under U.S. law, the American creditor would be considered to have a security interest in the
escrow fund and that remission of the funds to Italy would erode or eliminate that interest. Sivec,
476 B.R. at 320, 324. Assuming that Italian law would eliminate the U.S. security interest—and
the facts do not clearly establish it—the governing choice of law question would be whether the
rights of the creditor should be governed by the location of the collateral or the law governing the
insolvency.
136. Global Rules, supra note 61, r. 15.
137. In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1038–39 (5th Cir. 2012).
138. Cases in the Fifth Circuit “seem broadly to foreclose non-consensual non-debtor releases
and permanent injunctions.” In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 252 (5th Cir. 2009) (collecting
cases).
139. In re Vitro, 701 F.3d at 1039–40.
140. Id. at 1053–61.
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guarantees by Vitro’s non-debtor subsidiaries were governed by New York
law and were confirmed by New York judgments.141 The subsidiaries were
not debtors under any bankruptcy law, and there was no lex fori concursus,
as there were no insolvency proceedings involving the subsidiaries.142 It is
suggested that a choice of law analysis would place the center of gravity in
the United States rather than in Mexico, or would deem the United States to
have the greater interest in the application of its laws.
V. CHOICE OF LAW AND “COOPERATION” AND
“COORDINATION”
Choice of law analysis could also help resolve another issue that arises
in many cross-border insolvency cases. One of the salient principles of
chapter 15 and the Model Law on which it is based is the requirement of
“cooperation” and “coordination.” Articles 25 and 26 of the Model Law,
adopted in the United States as §§ 1525 and 1526 of chapter 15, require
cooperation “to the maximum extent possible” between courts and between
estate representatives.143 Although the mandate of §§ 1525 and 1526 is
similar to the common law doctrine of comity, and although there are many
decisions under chapter 15 that speak warmly of comity and cross-border
cooperation, there appears to be no reported decision of any U.S. court that
enforces cooperation as a binding statutory obligation.
Cooperation and coordination would more likely become a reality if
choice of law principles were more frequently used to resolve conflicts that
inevitably arise. The potential that a choice of law analysis can resolve even
the thorniest cross-border conflict is illustrated by a well-known dispute
arising from the Lehman Brothers failure. In Lehman Brothers Special
Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.,144 the U.S. court
declared unenforceable, by virtue of U.S. insolvency law, a provision in
certain collateralized swap agreements that changed the order of priority of
payment upon an event of default, including a bankruptcy default.145 The
movant and debtor in question was Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
(LBSF), and the default was occasioned by the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc. (LBHI), its ultimate parent and the “credit support provider”
for LBSF’s payment obligations under the swaps.146 The change in the
order of priority was a critical provision in the agreements: prior to a
default, the contracts provided that LBSF would have the right to receive
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1043.
See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, aarts. 25, 26; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1525, 1526 (2006).
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd., 422 B.R. 407 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010).
145. Id. at 418–20.
146. Id. at 411. The chapter 11 filing of LBSF took place on October 3, 2008; the filing by the
parent took place two weeks earlier on September 15, 2008.
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payment under the swaps (and would presumably be obligated to pay the
bondholders); after an event of default, when the bondholders would
presumably be unpaid, the trustee, on behalf of the bondholders, would
have priority rights over the collateral.147 The conflict of law issue arose
because the swaps had been entered into in England, and the collateral was
there.
At the time of the decision by the U.S. bankruptcy court, there had
already been extensive litigation in England regarding the priority rights of
the parties, and the English courts had ruled that the change in priority was
valid and enforceable and did not violate an “anti-deprivation principle”
under English law.148 The U.S. court recognized that its decision had “the
potential for conflicting rulings due to differences in the law being applied
by each tribunal to the underlying dispute.”149 Nevertheless, it found that
“the English Courts did not take into account principles of United States
bankruptcy law”; that as general matter “‘courts will not extend comity to
foreign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to the policies or
prejudicial to the interests of the United States’”;150 and that the English
decision was not entitled to preclusive effect or to comity.151 Reaching the
U.S. bankruptcy law issues, the court found that the change in priority was
invalid as an ipso facto provision, that the change had been triggered by the
filing of LBHI, and that it was unenforceable under U.S. law.152 It
recognized that “[t]his decision places BNY [the defendant in the United
States] in a difficult position in light of the contrary determination of the
English Courts confirming that Noteholder Priority applies to claims made
against it in England by [the Plaintiff] Perpetual.”153 In conclusion, it called
for the parties, this Court and the English Courts to work in a coordinated
and cooperative way to identify means to reconcile the conflicting
judgments. The Court directs that the parties attend a status conference to
be held on the next available omnibus hearing date in the Debtors’ cases

147. Id. at 413–14.
148. Id. at 410–11. In the English courts, the plaintiff was Perpetual Trustee Company Limited,

an English company that held the credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes, and the defendant was
BNY Corporate Trustee Services, a corporate trustee doing business in England which apparently
held the collateral. See Perpetual Tr. Co. Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd., [2009] EWHC
(Ch) 1912; [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1160.
149. Lehman Bros., 422 B.R. at 411. The principles of the decisions of the lower English courts
in effect when the U.S. case was decided were later affirmed in a different case by the U.K.
Supreme Court, which did not deal in any substantive manner with the ruling in the United States.
See Belmont Park Inv. PTY Ltd. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd., [2011] UKSC 38.
150. Lehman Bros., 422 B.R. at 417 (quoting Pravin Banker Assoc. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del
Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997)).
151. Id. at 416–17.
152. Id. at 418–19.
153. Id. at 423.
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for purposes of exploring means to harmonize the decisions of this Court
and the English Courts.154

This conclusion, it is suggested, left the conflict wholly unresolved. A
choice of law determination, deciding whether to apply English or U.S. law
to determine the validity of the disputed contractual provision, would have
pointed the way to a resolution of the conflict and would thus have
promoted one of the major goals of the Model Law and chapter 15,
cooperation among courts and among estate administrators.
CONCLUSION: CHOICE OF LAW UNDER CHAPTER 15
Based on the text and developing law under chapter 15 in the United
States, it seems difficult to maintain the position taken by the Legislative
Guide that the lex fori concursus should govern virtually all issues in a
cross-border insolvency case. No U.S. case has so held, and the provisions
of chapter 15 relating to sufficient protection and the requirement that the
five subsections of § 1507 be satisfied if “additional assistance” is to be
granted make it likely that a strict lex fori concursus rule will not be readily
adopted in the United States. Certainly, the requirement of § 1521(b) that
creditors “in the United States” be sufficiently protected before property is
turned over to a foreign representative would protect secured creditors
against loss of their collateral located in the United States by application of
foreign law.155 In a proceeding under chapter 15 and especially in cases
involving security interests under chapter 15, absolute deference to the lex
fori concursus cannot be maintained.
Nevertheless, even if total deference to the lex fori concursus cannot be
maintained under chapter 15, recognition of the choice of law issues that
arise in chapter 15 cases would give appropriate weight to the importance of
the lex fori concursus as a matter of principle and frame the issues by
reference to familiar concepts such as the “center of gravity.” In ,many
cases it would appropriately inform and circumscribe the scope of novel
and undefined terms such as “sufficient protection,” and “additional

154. Id.
155. One case that dealt explicitly with the provision of sufficient protection to a secured

creditor under chapter 15 is In re Tri-Cont’l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006).
There, a creditor who asserted a judgment lien against property of the foreign debtor in the United
States objected to chapter 15 recognition and asserted that it would not be sufficiently protected if
the foreign representative was able to use the collateral. The court held that if the creditor in fact
held a security interest in the property, the creditor was entitled to sufficient protection, which
would be in effect the same adequate protection afforded secured creditors in plenary cases in the
United States. As an interim measure, the foreign representative was accordingly permitted to take
possession but not to repatriate the collateral. Pre-chapter 15 authority under § 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code also required that the U.S. security interests held by creditors be protected. See
Bank of New York v. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001), supra text accompanying
note 42.
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assistance,” and point the way to a resolution of disputes in accordance with
the intent of the statute.

